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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 2003, lifestyle guru Martha Stewart was indicted
on multiple criminal and civil charges by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC or Commission).1  The charges, including
obstruction of justice and civil insider trading, stemmed from
Stewart's sale of ImClone stock shortly before the Food and Drug
Administration rejected a drug produced by ImClone and sent the
company's stock price tumbling. 2 Although Stewart could face a
number of serious penalties under her criminal indictment, the
primary remedy sought by the SEC for her civil insider trading
charges is rather uncommon-a bar from serving as a director of
Martha Stewart Living or any other public company. 3
The SEC's attempt to bar Martha Stewart from serving as a
director came on the heels of new "officer and director bar" legislation
that was passed in the wake of the collapse of Enron and other recent
corporate scandals. 4 In response to public outcry over these corporate




4. The first large-scale scandal that rocked securities markets involved the Enron
corporation, which slid into bankruptcy after it slowly became clear that accounting tricks had
been hiding massive losses on the corporate books for years. Marianne Lavelle, The Actions of
Corporate Honchos Horrified the Nation. So When's the Day of Reckoning?, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REP., Dec. 30, 2002, at 34. Shortly thereafter, Adelphia Communications's CEO was
taken away in handcuffs after the revelation of billions of dollars of off-balance sheet loans made
to his family and guaranteed by the company. Id. at 40; see also Greg Levine, Faces in the News,
Forbes.com (July 24, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/24/0724facesam-print.html. Then,
WorldCom announced that it had improperly accounted for expenses in previous years, and it,
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scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which President
Bush signed into law on July 30, 2002. 5 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
added a number of provisions to the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) in an attempt to
increase the accuracy of audits and financial disclosures and to
increase the accountability of and penalties for dishonest corporate
officers and directors. 6 In comments at the signing, President Bush
discussed the need to restore public faith in America's economic
system and noted ways that the new bill would increase corporate
oversight and stiffen penalties for corporate wrongdoers. 7 Sarbanes-
Oxley increased authority to the SEC by allowing the SEC to
permanently bar corporate wrongdoers from serving as officers or
directors of any publicly traded company.8 Upon signing the act into
law, President Bush declared that "[t]he SEC will now have the
administrative authority to bar dishonest directors and officers from
ever again serving in positions of corporate responsibility."9
Two specific sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act changed the
existing law concerning suspension of officers and directors. The first
is section 305, "Officer and Director Bars and Penalties," which
modifies the 1933 and 1934 Acts by lowering the standard that the
SEC has to meet to persuade a federal court to issue an officer or
director bar.10 The second, more important change is found in section
1105, "Authority of the Commission to Prohibit Persons from Serving
as Officers or Directors."11 This section allows the SEC, for the first
time, to issue officer and director bars directly as part of a cease-and-
desist proceeding, thereby eliminating the requirement that the SEC
go through a federal court. 12 Under these provisions, if an officer or
too, entered bankruptcy after $9 billion in misstated earnings were revealed. Lavelle, supra, at
36. The scandals continued with Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski siphoning $600 million in company
money for his personal use and with the discovery of accounting fraud at Global Crossing-the
list is all too long. See id. at 33, 36.
5. See Phyllis Plitch, Execs Seen 'Scrambling' to Meet New Certification Rules, Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 2002, WL 9/3/02 DJNSPLUS 17:30:00.
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
7201-66).
7. President George W. Bush, Remarks to Attendees at Signing of Corporate Corruption
Bill (July 30, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730.html
[hereinafter President Bush's Remarks].
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 305, 1105.
9. Bush, supra note 7. This change had been recommended in President Bush's ten point
plan. 148 CONG. REC. H1553 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. LaFalce). Point five of
President Bush's proposal was that "CEOs ... should lose their right to serve in any corporate
leadership positions." Id.
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305.




director's conduct both violates an antifraud provision of federal
securities laws 13 and demonstrates "unfitness" to serve, the SEC may
bar that officer or director from serving in that capacity with any
other public company in the future. 14 The SEC can pursue such a bar
in an administrative cease-and-desist proceeding or an action brought
in the courts. 15
By enacting sections 305 and 1105 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Congress has made it easier for the SEC to permanently bar securities
law violators from corporate boardrooms. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley,
relatively few such permanent suspensions were obtained.1 6 Under
Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC no longer has to show a defendant's
"substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director but, instead,
only has to show his or her "unfitness."17 This deletion of one word
may appear insignificant, but it is the result of substantial
congressional debate, and it should signal to courts that Congress is
not satisfied with the high standard judges have required the SEC to
meet in the past.18 Moreover, the permanent suspension may become
increasingly important in the future as political pressure in the wake
of the Enron debacle and other scandals forces the SEC to crack down
on corporate fraud more vigilantly.19
This Note analyzes the wisdom and necessity of Congress
increasing the SEC's permanent suspension powers. Part II provides
background on the SEC's suspension powers before Sarbanes-Oxley
was enacted, focusing particularly on the Remedies Act of 1990. Part
III examines the changes to the SEC's suspension powers wrought by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, some of the iterations that existed in the
Act's legislative history, and the likelihood that these provisions will
be used more frequently in the future. Parts IV and V address
whether the SEC's increased suspension powers are necessary. This
Note argues that, while forces such as market pressures, national
exchange rules, and criminal and civil sanctions provide strong
investor protection, there are situations in which those forces are not
13. The antifraud provisions are section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, the SEC rules
promulgated thereunder, and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and the rules promulgated
thereunder. Id.
14. Id.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305.
15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1105; see also Mark S. Bergman, Congress Passes Accounting
Reform and Corporate Governance Legislation, ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., Aug. 28, 2002,
at 16.
16. See infra Part II.
17. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305.
18. See infra Part III.B (discussing Rep. LaFalce's critique of the previous judicial
standard).
19. See infra Part III.E.
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sufficient. It is in these situations that SEC suspensions are
necessary to prevent fraud and serious harm to investors. Part VI
addresses certain concerns that have been raised about due process
and the potential impact of the SEC's expanded power on the
availability of qualified directors, arguing that the benefits of the
SEC's permanent suspension powers outweigh the risks in these
areas. This Note concludes that, on balance, the SEC's increased
suspension powers will benefit United States markets. It then offers a
few suggestions concerning enforcement in the coming years.
II. SEC REMOVAL ACTIONS PRIOR TO SARBANES-OXLEY
A. SEC Injunctions and Removal Actions Prior to the Remedies Act of
1990
Before the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 (Remedies Act) was enacted, the SEC did not have
specific statutory authority to permanently bar people from serving as
officers or directors.20 Under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1), the SEC was able
to seek (from the federal courts) temporary and permanent injunctions
forbidding defendants from violating securities laws in the future, but
the SEC had no specific authority to permanently suspend defendants
from acting as directors. 21 For example, in SEC v. Benson, the SEC
brought an action against a company president who engaged in a
fraudulent scheme to divert over $500,000 from the manufacturing
company at which he worked in violation of numerous provisions of
the federal securities laws. 22 The district court "permanently enjoined
[the president] from future violations of the Federal securities laws." 23
This sort of injunction had no immediate direct effect, as the
defendant was not free to violate securities laws before the injunction.
However, the injunction could damage a defendant's reputation and
lead to more severe penalties if further violations occurred. 24
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). Note that subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) were added as part of the
Remedies Act on October 15, 1990.
21. § 78u(d)(1).
22. 657 F.Supp. 1122, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
23. Id. at 1134.
24. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that
in spite of the harmful impact that injunctive relief would have on the reputations of certain
individual defendants, a permanent injunction was properly issued against them in light of the
blatant nature of their violations and their professional occupations which put them in positions
where they could misappropriate investor funds in later offerings).
2003] 1875
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The primary purpose of these SEC injunctions was to prevent
further violations rather than to punish violators. 25 In fact, a remedy
found to be primarily punitive could be overturned. SEC injunctions
were therefore only to be issued where there was a risk of future
violations. 26 To determine whether a future violation was likely,
courts looked to the totality of the circumstances and considered five
specific factors including the defendant's degree of scienter and
remorse concerning the original violation, the defendant's previous
record of wrongdoing, and whether the defendant's occupation put him
in a position to commit further violations.27 The burden of proof
regarding the likelihood of future violations rested with the SEC.28
Although it lacked the statutory authority to seek a permanent
bar prior to the Remedies Act, the SEC managed to get some
defendants to submit to temporary or permanent suspension through
consent decrees. As of 1989, the SEC had never secured a court order
suspending an executive, but it had secured consent decrees for
temporary or permanent suspension of approximately one hundred
individuals. 29 Several of these consent decrees prohibited defendants
from ever again serving as officers or directors of any public
company. 30 In other cases, defendants agreed to lesser suspensions,
25. SEC v. Koracorp Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1978).
26. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the SEC
cannot obtain injunctive relief under the Securities Exchange Act where there is no reasonable
likelihood of a repeated violation of the Act).
27. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the crucial test in
deciding whether a permanent injunction should be issued is whether there was a reasonable
likelihood that the wrong would be repeated). The likelihood that the wrong will be repeated
should take into account the totality of circumstances, and should include consideration of the
following: (1) existence of past violations; (2) degree of scienter involved; (3) whether the
infraction was an isolated occurrence; (4) whether defendant continues to maintain that past
conduct was blameless; (5) whether, because of profession or occupation, the defendant might be
in a position where future violations can be anticipated. Id.
28. SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1974) (stating that the SEC must
meet "proper showing" standard of statutes and must present a prima facie case of securities
laws with reasonable likelihood that the violation will be repeated).
29. See Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks at the Glasser LegalWorks 20th Annual Federal
Securities Institute (Feb. 15, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech /spch538.htm; see also Jayne
W. Barnard, The Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989. Disenfranchising
Shareholders in Order to Protect Them, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 32, 40 (1989) ("[A] court could
fashion a decree in an SEC action seeking injunctive relief which would incorporate an order
removing and suspending a miscreant executive from continuing service with the corporation in
which misconduct occurred; however, none has ever done so in a fully litigated proceeding.
Rather, the SEC has secured such orders solely in the context of negotiated consent decrees.").
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Gulf Res., Inc., No. CA-3-83-1653H, 1984 SEC LEXIS 2168, at *1-2
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 1984) (defendant prohibited from becoming or acting as an officer, director or
control person of any public company absent SEC permission); SEC v. Weil, No. 79-440-Civ-T-H,
1979 SEC LEXIS 1803, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 1979) (complaint requesting that defendant be
barred from assuming a position as an officer or director of any publicly traded issuer).
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usually ranging from three to five years. 31 The SEC managed to
obtain these consent decrees even though it did not have statutory
authority to seek court-ordered suspensions until the passage of the
Remedies Act in 1990.32
B. The Remedies Act of 1990
Wanting to more effectively prosecute corporate criminals, the
SEC sought statutory authority to issue permanent bars without
involving the courts. 33 In a 1987 report, the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the Treadway Commission), chaired
by former SEC Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr., recommended
that "the SEC . . .seek [congressional] authority to bar or suspend
corporate officers and directors involved in fraudulent financial
reporting from future service in that capacity in a public company."34
It initially appeared that the SEC would gain this right when the first
version of the Remedies Act was introduced in 1989.35 However, after
opposition by groups such as the American Bar Association's Section
on Business Law, Richard Breeden, the SEC's new chairman,
amended the bill to narrow the SEC's suspension powers. 36 As
amended, the bill required that the SEC seek officer and director
suspension orders from federal courts rather than being able to issue
such orders on its own.37 Furthermore, the amendments only allowed
permanent officer and director bars for securities violations involving
"scienter-based fraud."38
The amendments recommended by Chairman Breeden were
adopted, and, on October 15, 1990, President George H. Bush signed
31. Barnard, supra note 29, at 41 n.70, 54 n.158 (1989) (listing twenty-seven different
consent decrees in which defendants agreed to suspensions of various lengths and severities).
32. The SEC sought this authority for some time. As early as 1984, then-SEC
Commissioner James Treadway recommended that the SEC should have power to bar executives
for securities violations. SEC Should Have Power to Bar Executives for Securities Violations,
Treadway Says, 16 ANDREWS SEC. REG. & L. REP. at 1487 (1984).
33. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 66-67
(1987), http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/hackenbrack/acg5637/PDF/NCFFR.pdf.
34. Id. at 66.
35. Jayne W. Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive "Substantially Unfit to Serve'7, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (1992).
36. Id. at 1493-94.
37. Id.; see also Matthew Scott Morris, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990: By Keeping Up with the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal Is
Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151, 158 n.26 (1993).
38. Barnard, supra note 35, at 1494. In other words, officer and director bar orders would




the Remedies Act into law.39 As enacted, the Remedies Act authorized
the SEC to seek temporary or permanent suspensions in federal court
against individuals who violated the antifraud provisions of securities
laws and who demonstrated substantial unfitness to serve as officers
or directors. 40 In several cases decided after the enactment of the
Remedies Act, courts claimed that the Remedies Act's suspension
provisions were simply a codification of courts' existing authority to
fashion an equitable remedy. 41 However, there do not appear to be
any pre-1990 cases involving the SEC where courts actually issued
such bars.42
The Remedies Act also gave the SEC power to issue "cease-and-
desist orders" against securities law violators. 43  With this new
authority, the SEC could order a person who it believed had violated
or was about to violate federal securities laws to cease the illegal
activity, make an accounting, and disgorge any unlawful profit. 44
Unlike injunctions, cease-and-desist orders could be issued by the SEC
directly, without the need for a court order.45
The Remedies Act was a victory of sorts for those in the SEC
who sought a more pointed method of dealing with perpetrators of
securities fraud and a more effective means of preventing future
violations. However, the statute was far from clear as to what sort of
behavior would result in a suspension. The statute called for bar
orders against individuals who (1) committed securities fraud and (2)
demonstrated "substantial unfitness" to serve as officers and
directors. 46 The requirements for finding violation of securities fraud
39. Morris, supra note 37, at 159.
40. The new bar provision was added as 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)-(3), § 77t(e) (2000).
41. SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 837 F. Supp. 587, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("Once the
equity jurisdiction of the district court has been properly invoked by a showing of a securities law
violation, the court possesses the necessary power to fashion an appropriate remedy." (citing
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972))); SEC v. First Pac.
Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 n.8 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The Act merely codified the equitable
authority to impose officer and director bar [sic] which the courts already possessed and
exercised." (quoting Drexel, 837 F. Supp. at 613)).
42. See Barnard, supra note 29, at 40.
43. See Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 101-421, § 8A, 104 Stat. 933, 933-34 (1990)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1); Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 101-429, § 21C, 104 Stat.
931, 939 (1990) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-3, 78w(d)).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-3(c) (2000).
45. See Daniel J. Morrissey, SEC Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427, 463-64 (2001). Officer
and director suspension orders had to be obtained through court-ordered injunctions under the
Remedies Act, but after Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC can issue such orders directly through a cease-
and-desist proceeding. See infra Part III.
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e), 78u(d)(2) (2000).
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under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 had been spelled out by case law,47
but the meaning of the additional "substantial unfitness" requirement
was unclear. The statute did not define "substantial unfitness," nor
did the legislative history of the Remedies Act reveal Congress's intent
in adding that phrase. 48 It was therefore left to the courts to decide
when a person should be deemed "substantially unfit" to serve as an
officer or director of a publicly traded company.
C. Case Law after the Remedies Act
The specific application of the Remedies Act's suspension
provisions began to take shape in the mid-1990s. Through a series of
cases, courts set parameters for permanent suspension orders and
eventually fashioned a judicial definition of "substantial unfitness."
According to some in Congress and the SEC, the courts established a
definition and set parameters far too stringent, making it excessively
difficult for the SEC to permanently suspend corporate wrongdoers. 49
One of the first suspension cases was SEC v. Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc.50 In Drexel, the SEC sought a permanent and
unqualified bar against Victor Posner and his son Stephen, both long-
time business associates of financiers Michael Milken and Ivan
Boesky. 51 The case was the SEC's third lawsuit against Victor Posner,
who previously had been indicted for tax fraud.52 The Posners were
found to have collaborated with Milken and Boesky to violate sections
10(b) and 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act in order to carry out a
hostile acquisition.53 As a result of their securities fraud, the Posners
were able to acquire control of Fischbach Corporation and pay
themselves over three million dollars in salary over four years even as
the company did poorly. 54 The court noted that this was not the first
time Victor Posner had committed corporate waste-in a previous
47. The elements for a cause of action for securities fraud include misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact, scienter, reliance, and causation. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
48. See SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y.
July 26, 1993) ("The statutes do not define 'substantial unfitness,' and the legislative history is
not instructive as to what Congress intended this term to mean." (citing S. REP. No. 101-337, at
3-4 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-616, at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1379, 1395-
96)).
49. See infra notes 89-92, 109 and accompanying text.
50. 837 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
51. Id. at 596.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 609.
54. Id. at 612.
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case, he had accumulated $173,270 in restaurant bills at company
expense in a single year.55
In deciding whether to issue a permanent bar against the
Posners, the Drexel court did not discuss the meaning of "substantial
unfitness," but instead looked to a Senate Banking Committee report
on the Remedies Act.56 The report indicated that permanent bars
would be especially appropriate where (1) the violation was egregious,
(2) the violator was a recidivist, (3) the violation had occurred by a
defendant serving in a corporate or fiduciary capacity, (4) public
shareholders lacked control to remove the violator, and (5) broader
public concerns were involved. 57 The Drexel court found that each of
those circumstances applied, and issued a permanent bar against
Victor and Stephen Posner. 58 The Drexel court stated that "one would
be hard-pressed to find more worthy candidates to be barred from
serving as officers and directors than the Posners."59
The decision in Drexel was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) in SEC v. Posner.60
In order to avoid ruling on whether the Remedies Act applied
retroactively, the Posner court upheld the district court's permanent
bar based on the court's pre-1990 "general equitable powers" to
fashion an equitable remedy.61 Because the Second Circuit in Posner
did not affirm based on the Remedies Act, it did not discuss the
legislative history as had the lower court.6 2 However, it did cite
similar aggravating factors such as the defendants' high degree of
scienter, their past securities law violations, their lack of assurances
against future violations, and the need to protect public investors. 63
In 1995, a California district court considered another SEC
request to bar an executive from serving as an officer or director.6 4 In
SEC v. Sands, a bank executive allegedly violated securities fraud
laws by, among other things, improperly booking (as assets) on bank
financial statements certain CDs issued by the National Bank of
55. Id. at 604.
56. Id. at 613 (citing S. REP. No. 101-337, at 22 (1990)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 614-15.
59. Id.
60. 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994).
61. Id. at 521.
62. Id. at 521-22.
63. Id. The Posner court stated, "The [defendants] seem to be shocked by what they see as
the draconian remedy of eternal boardroom banishment. We intend our affirmance of [the
district court's] judgment in this respect as a sharp warning to those who violate the securities
laws that they face precisely such banishment." Id. at 522.
64. See SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
1880 [Vol. 56:1871
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Liberia that were unfunded and uncollectible. 65 The Sands court
declined to issue summary judgment concerning the bar but stated
that the SEC would bear the burden at trial of proving the likelihood
of future securities law violations.66 Like the Drexel and Posner
courts, the Sands court did not engage in any discussion of what
constituted "substantial unfitness." Instead, the Sands court focused
almost exclusively on the likelihood of future violations, looking to
precedent for a five-part totality of the circumstances test for
predicting them. 67 After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor
of the SEC on all of its claims and permanently barred Mr. Sands from
acting as an officer or director of a public company. 68
The same week that Sands was decided, the Second Circuit
established a six-part test for "substantial unfitness," one that became
the widely adopted standard.69 In 1993 and 1994, the SEC brought
separate actions for insider trading against Ratilal Patel and Dilap
Shah, seeking, among other remedies, an order to bar the two from
ever serving as officers or directors of a public company. 70 Patel was a
founder, director, and senior vice president of a generic drug
manufacturing company and Shah was president of a subsidiary of the
company. 71 From 1986 through 1988, Shah and Patel paid unlawful
gratuities totaling $9,600 to two chemists who worked in the FDA's
Generic Drug Division reviewing applications for drug product
approvals.7 2 During that same period, the company submitted a
misleading application to the FDA for approval of a new generic
drug. 73 The application contained a backdated certificate intended to
conceal the fact that certain required studies had not been performed
65. Id. at 1154.
66. Id. at 1158.
67. Id. ("In predicting the likelihood of future violations, the court looks to the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the defendant and his violations. Factors to be considered include (1)
the degree of scienter involved; (2) the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction; (3) the
defendant's recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct; (4) the likelihood, because of
defendant's professional occupation, that future violations might occur; and (5) the sincerity of
the defendant's assurances against future violations." (citing SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 655
(9th Cir. 1980))).
68. See SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1998). This district
court decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which followed the six-part
test used by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). See First Pac.
Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1193.
69. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995).
70. SEC v. Patel, No. 93 Civ. 4603, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9479, at *5 (S.D N.Y. July 12,
1994) ; SEC v. Shah, No. 92 Civ. 1952, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 26,
1993).
71. Patel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9479, at *2; Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *2..
72. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *2.
73. Patel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9479, at *3.
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on the final version of the drug.74 In the months before news of the
bribery became public and led to a large drop in the company's stock
price, Patel and Shah both sold a number of shares and avoided losses
of $453,203 and $121,340 respectively. 75 In deciding whether to issue
a permanent bar, the district court observed that the Remedies Act
does not define "substantial unfitness," the legislative history is not
instructive as to what the term should mean, and, as of that date, no
court had construed the term's meaning. 76
To determine whether the "substantial unfitness" standard was
met for Shah and Patel, the district court adopted a multi-part test
recommended in an article by Professor Jayne Barnard.77 Professor
Barnard's article suggested that courts consider six factors when
determining substantial unfitness: "(1) the 'egregiousness' of the
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant's 'repeat
offender' status; (3) the defendant's 'role' or position when he engaged
in the fraud; (4) the defendant's degree of scienter; (5) the defendant's
economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct
will recur."78  This six-factor test is similar but not identical to the
five-part test used by some courts prior to the Remedies Act to
determine the likelihood of future violations. 79 Applying the six-factor
test, the district court found that some of the factors were present
with respect to each defendant and, on balance, that Patel should and
Shah should not be permanently barred from serving as a director or
officer of a public company.80
On appeal by Patel, the Second Circuit reversed Patel's lifetime
suspension.81  In this decision (Patel I1), the court validated the
district court's use of Professor Barnard's six-part test, but disagreed
with the district court's assessment of Patel's behavior and added
additional requirements to make the test more stringent.8 2 The Patel
74. Id.
75. Patel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9479, at *13; Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *20.
76. Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *19-20.
77. Id. at *20 (citing Barnard, supra note 35, at 1510-22).
78. Barnard, supra note 35, at 1510-21. Barnard's article actually recommended a seventh
factor as well, but the court, without explanation or comment, did not include it. Shah, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *20. The seventh factor was "The Defendant's Appreciation of an
Executive's Fiduciary Obligations." See Barnard, supra note 35, at 1521-22.
79. See, e.g., SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 912 (3d Cir. 1980); supra note 27.
80. Patel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9479, at *12-14; Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at
*20-22.
81. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1995).
82. Id. at 141 ("[T]he district court properly took into account the six factors that it
identified in evaluating substantial unfitness. These factors are useful in making the unfitness
assessment, although we do not mean to say that they are the only factors that may be taken
into account or even that it is necessary to apply all these factors in every case. A district court
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H court focused particularly on the defendant's repeat offender status
and the likelihood of recurrence.8 3 The court stated that, "[a]lthough
it is not essential for a lifetime ban that there be past violations, we
think that it is essential, in the absence of such violations, that a
district court articulate the factual basis for a finding of the likelihood
of recurrence. '8 4
Furthermore, the Patel II court read the bar statute to suggest
that a court pondering the imposition of a permanent bar should first
consider whether a conditional or temporary bar would be more
appropriate, especially when there is no prior history of unfitness.8 5
In other words, without such prior violations, courts should not
permanently bar defendants unless courts can articulate both (a) a
factual reason to think that the defendant is likely to repeat his fraud,
and (b) a reason that a conditional or temporary bar is insufficient to
prevent a future violation. The Patel II court's six-factor test and its
added scrutiny for first-time offenders made permanent bars quite
difficult for the SEC to obtain.
The six-part test used in Patel II was also adopted by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.86 The test has now been embraced by every
court that has considered the matter,8 7 and was followed as recently
as July 16, 2002-two weeks before Sarbanes-Oxley was signed into
law.8 8 It remains to be seen whether the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
should be afforded substantial discretion in deciding whether to impose a bar to employment in a
public company.")
83. Id. at 141-42.
84. Id. at 142.
85. A conditional bar might be one limited to a certain industry, while a temporary bar
would be limited to a fixed period of time. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the statutes
provide that a bar may be imposed "conditionally or unconditionally" and "permanently or for
such a period of time as [the court] shall determine." Id. From that language, the court
concluded that the legislature intended that a court should consider whether a conditional or
limited bar is sufficient before imposing a permanent bar, especially where there is no prior
history of unfitness. Id.
86. See SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 1998).
87. Jayne W. Barnard, Does Corporate Law Protect the Interests of Shareholders and Other
Stakeholders?: The SEC's Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1259-
60 (2002).
88. SEC v. Robinson, No. 00 Civ 742, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12811, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July
16, 2002). The SEC alleged that Mr. Robinson obtained at least $400,000 from investors by
fraudulently representing that that his company's sales of "mobile wireless digital personal
security alarm systems for cars" were estimated to grow to $44 billion by 2005 even though the
company had no product, no financing, and no manufacturing contract. Id. at *2. Following the
six-part test from SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995), the Robinson court found Robinson's
flagrant misrepresentations, repeat offenses, scienter, and likelihood of future offenses
warranted that he should be permanently barred from serving as an officer or director of any
public company. Id. at *14-20.
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will cause courts to reexamine the six-factor test for officer and
director suspension.
Not surprisingly, certain SEC staff members have complained
that the judicial standard makes it too difficult to bar corporate
wrongdoers.8 9  The judicial standard for "substantial unfitness"
adopted by Patel II and followed by subsequent courts is a high one.
In February of 2002, Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the Division of
Enforcement at the SEC, argued that the statutory scheme that
allows only federal courts, and not the SEC, to impose officer and
director bars was inadequate. 90 Cutler also asserted that case law has
created a "burdensome and overly restrictive test" that places an
"unreasonably high" burden of proof on the SEC.91 For a number of
years, therefore, the SEC has pushed for lower standards for
permanent suspensions and for the authority to issue suspension
orders without going through the federal courts. 92
III. CHANGES TO SUSPENSION ACTIONS WROUGHT BY SARBANES-OXLEY
A. The House of Representatives Bill
On April 24, 2002, the House of Representatives passed a draft
of the bill that would eventually become the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 93 In
its section on officer and director bars, the House draft tracked, for the
most part, the judicial standard for substantial unfitness from Patel
11.94 The House's draft, however, would have made enforcement by
the SEC easier in two important ways. First, the House version's
explanation of what constitutes substantial unfitness contained only
five of the six elements of the Patel 11 test, dropping the repeat
offender consideration. 95 Second, and more importantly, the House
89. Barnard, supra note 87, at 1253-54.
90. Cutler, supra note 29.
91. Id. ("When confronted with [several cases in which courts refused to impose permanent
officer and director bars in spite of egregious conduct by the defendants], it is hard for me, at
least, to avoid the conclusion that, when it comes to 0 and D bars, the courts have simply lost
their way .... In today's complex economy and volatile market, a single, serious breach of the
public trust, in my view, undeniably renders one 'substantially unfit' for service as an officer or
director. The layering on of additional tests simply frustrates the goals of the statute and
endangers the interests of the investing public.").
92. See Barnard, supra note 87, at 1255-56.
93. 148 CONG. REC. H1544 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002).




bill allowed the SEC to bring an action directly, without going through
the courts. 96
Section 11(a) of the House bill gave the SEC authority, in any
cease-and-desist proceeding, to prohibit violators of securities laws
from serving as officers or directors. 97 The standard that the SEC had
to meet was essentially the same as that set forth in the Remedies
Act: violation of securities fraud laws and conduct that demonstrated
substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director. 98 However,
section 11(b) of the bill provided, for the first time, a statutory test for
a finding of substantial unfitness:
(b) Finding of Substantial Unfitness. In making any determination that a person's
conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such
issuer, the Commission shall consider
(1) the severity of the person's conduct giving rise to the violation, and the person's role
or position when he engaged in the violation;
(2) the person's degree of scienter;
(3) the person's economic gain as a result of the violation; and
(4) the likelihood that the conduct giving rise to the violation, or similar conduct as
defined in subsection (a), may recur if the person is not so prohibited.9 9
The four-part statutory test is almost identical to the six-part
Patel II test. The only differences are that two elements are combined
in part one and that the repeat offender element is eliminated. By
eliminating the repeat offender element, this bill probably would have
eliminated the Patel II court's apparent presumption against
permanently suspending first-time offenders.
B. Representative LaFalce's Critique
United States Representative Michael G. Oxley (R. Ohio),
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, was the sponsor
of the House draft. Not everyone agreed that the draft was an
improvement over the existing standard for officer and director bars.
Representative John LaFalce (D. New York) argued that, by codifying
the case law standard, the bill only strengthened an unnecessarily





100. 148 CONG. REC. H1583 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002).
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The SEC said that existing case law makes it virtually impossible for them to do this, to
bar unfit officers and directors. And what have the Republicans done? They have taken
that bad case law and codified it. In that respect the Republican bill is worse than the
status quo.
10 1
Representative LaFalce wanted the Republican- sponsored bill
to go farther to make it easier to obtain officer and director
suspensions, but his comments were an overstatement. He failed to
mention either that the Republican bill gave the SEC the power to bar
persons directly or that the repeat offender part of the test had been
removed.102 Representative LaFalce offered a substitute bill that
would have changed "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness" and left the
term undefined.103 The LaFalce substitute bill was rejected by a vote
of 219 to 202,104 and Representative Oxley's bill was adopted by the
House instead.105
C. The Senate Bill
The Senate version of what became the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
initially did not give the SEC administrative authority to issue officer
and director bars.10 6 On July 10, 2002, then Senate minority leader
Trent Lott (R. Miss.) offered an amendment regarding officer and
director bars that was almost identical to the one previously proposed
by Representative LaFalce in the House.10 7  Senator Lott's
Amendment allowed the SEC to issue a bar order in a cease-and-desist
proceeding, and it also changed the standard from "substantial
unfitness" to "unfitness. °108 During the Senate discussion, Senator
Lott explained the need for his amendment:
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at H1580.
104. Id. at H1588-89.
105. Id. at H1592. The vote was 334-90. Id.
106. The first version was introduced June 25, 2002 by Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (D. Md.).
148 CONG. REc. S6013 (daily ed. June 25, 2002).
107. See 148 CONG. REC. 86543 (daily ed. July 10, 2002).
108. Id. Senator Lott's bar provision added the following subsection to 21C of the 1934 Act
and a parallel version for section 8A of the 1933 Act:
Authority of the Commission to Prohibit Persons From Serving as Officers or
Directors. In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the Commission
may issue an order to prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or
for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who has violated section 10(b)
of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an officer or director
of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of this
title or that is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d) of this title if the
person's conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such
issuer.
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Under current law, only a Federal court can issue an order prohibiting a person from
acting as an officer or director of a public company. The SEC cannot order this remedy
in its own administrative cease-and-desist proceedings .... This section would grant the
SEC authority to issue such orders if a person had committed a securities violation and
his or her conduct demonstrated unfitness to serve as an officer or a director. 109
The Lott amendment was passed by a vote of 97-0110 and was included
in the final version of the Senate bill, which passed 76-0.111
D. Final Version of the Act
The final version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act adopted the
language that Representative LaFalce and Senator Lott had
recommended concerning officer and director bars. Section 305 of
Sarbanes-Oxley changed the judicial standard from "substantial
unfitness" to "unfitness" without defining either term, 112 and section
1105 gave the SEC authority to bar people from serving as officers and
directors even in the absence of an order by a federal court.
11 3
The parallel version for section 8A of the 1933 Act had almost the same language and
simply referred to violations of 17(a)(1) rather than section 10(b).
Id.
109. Id. at S6545.
110. Id. at S6551.
111. 148 CONG. REC. S6779 (daily ed. July 15, 2002).
112. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 305, 116 Stat. 745, 778-79 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f)). This section reads
Sec. 305. OFFICER AND DIRECTOR BARS AND PENALTIES.
(a) Unfitness Standard.-
(1) Securities exchange act of 1934.- Section 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u(d)(2)) is amended by striking "substantial unfitness" and
inserting "unfitness".
(2) Securities act of 1933.- Section 20(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.
77t(e)) is amended by striking "substantial unfitness" and inserting "unfitness".
(b) Equitable Relief.-Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78u(d)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(5) Equitable Relief.- In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the
Commission under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek,
and any Federal court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors."
Id.
113. § 1105, 116 Stat. at 809-10. This section reads
Sec. 1105. AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION TO PROHIBIT PERSONS FROM
SERVING AS OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS.
(a) Securities Exchange Act of 1934.-Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 78u-3) is amended by adding at the end the following:
"(f) Authority of the Commission to Prohibit Persons From Serving as Officers or
Directors.-In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the Commission
may issue an order to prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or
for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who has violated section 10(b)
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Sarbanes-Oxley also amended section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 to provide that a federal court may grant "any equitable
relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of
investors." 114  This equitable relief section does not appear to add
anything new, but simply codifies the federal courts' broad power to
grant equitable relief.115
While the change from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness"
indicates that Congress considered the current standard too high,
Congress has left it to the SEC and the federal courts to decide what
the new standard should be. This could have unintended consequences
in either of two ways. On one hand, courts could completely reject the
six-part test from Patel II and allow the SEC to issue officer and
director bars almost any time securities laws have been violated. On
the other hand, courts could interpret the change to be only a slight
adjustment, and thus continue to apply the existing test with only a
slight increase in strictness." 6 In the future, it will become clear how
courts interpret the deletion of the word "substantial," and whether
the SEC's expanded cease-and-desist powers cause it to issue officer
and director bars more aggressively.
E. Likelihood That Officer and Director Suspensions Will Be Used
More Frequently
There are a number of reasons to think that the officer and
director bar provision will become much more prevalent and
important to securities law enforcement. Courts have been able to bar
or the rules or regulations thereunder, from acting as an officer or director of any
issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12, or that is
required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d), if the conduct of that person
demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or director of any such issuer."
(b) Securities Act of 1933.-Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77h-1)
is amended by adding at the end of the following:
"(f) Authority of the Commission to Prohibit Persons From Serving as Officers or
Directors.-In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), the Commission
may issue an order to prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or
for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who has violated section
17(a)(1) or the rules or regulations thereunder, from acting as an officer or director of
any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports pursuant to section
15(d) of that Act, if the conduct of that person demonstrates unfitness to serve as an
officer or director of any such issuer."
Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (Supp. 2003).
115. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103 (2d Cir. 1972).
116. The SEC could attempt to bypass the federal courts by using cease-and-desist orders for
officer and director bars, but these orders can always be appealed to the courts. Thus, the
judicial standard is ultimately the standard that the SEC will have to follow.
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corporate wrongdoers from serving as officers and directors for some
time, but the high judicial standard and the requirement that these
bars be issued by federal judges have resulted in relatively few such
bars to date. 117 However, because Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the SEC
to suspend directors and officers directly and lowers the requisite
standard, the SEC may find suspension to be one of its more effective
tools for deterring corporate fraud and stopping repeat offenders.
Further, the increased political pressure created in the wake of
2002's corporate scandals, may increase the prevalence of officer and
director suspension. As an example of this political pressure, a 127-
page report by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in October
2002 sharply criticized the SEC for its failure to catch the financial
fraud at Enron before it brought down the company. 118 The report
found "systemic and catastrophic failure" by the SEC in its
investigations and noted that the SEC failed to even review any of
Enron's annual reports after 1997.119 In addition to congressional
pressure, the media scrutiny that has followed the agency throughout
the corporate scandals and the mishaps of former SEC chairman
Harvey Pitt are likely to force the SEC to take an aggressive approach
to neutralizing dishonest directors and officers.1 20
The clearest indication that officer and director bars will be
used more frequently comes from remarks made by the director of the
Division of Enforcement at the SEC. In a February 15, 2002 speech, 121
Director Stephen M. Cutler made it clear that, in spite of his
frustration with the judicial standard in Patel II and other cases, he
was "steadfastly determined to be more aggressive in seeking officer
and director bars."122 Cutler also cited the statistical increase in the
SEC's suspension activities in recent years. He noted that in fiscal
year 2000 the Commission sought fourteen officer and director bars,
whereas in 2001 the SEC sought more than twice that number. 23
Cutler anticipated that the trend would continue upward in the
future. 124
117. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
118. See Jonathan Weil & John Wilke, Probe by Senate Says SEC Failed in Enron Case,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at C1.
119. Id.
120. See SEC Chief Resigns Under Fire: White House Relieved; Successor to Pitt Won't Be
Named Right Away, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at El (summarizing the actions and political
fall-out that resulted in Pitt's resignation).
121. This was about five months prior to the final passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
122. Cutler, supra note 29.




IV. MARKET FACTORS AND OTHER LAWS REDUCE THE NEED FOR
OFFICER & DIRECTOR SUSPENSION
Sarbanes-Oxley clearly gave the SEC greater power to bar
individuals from serving as officers or directors of publicly traded
companies. It is less clear, however, whether these changes are either
helpful in or necessary for protecting the investing public. Most
(though not all) corporate misconduct can be prevented more
effectively in ways other than SEC suspensions. Although this Note
argues that the suspension provisions do fill an important gap, most
corporate offenses can be prevented more effectively by market forces,
new rules by the national exchanges, and the toughening of criminal
sanctions brought about by Sarbanes-Oxley.
A. Market Forces Should Reduce Repeat Corporate Offenses
Market forces may be much more effective than any SEC
suspension in preventing repeat offenses by corporate criminals. The
stock market responds swiftly to allegations of corporate fraud,
especially after the Enron debacle and other similar scandals. 125 In
his testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services on
March 13, 2002, James Glassman argued against certain provisions in
Sarbanes-Oxley, pointing out that investors can effectively punish bad
behavior by corporate leadership and that short sellers have an
incentive to expose corporate wrongdoing. 26 Of course, it is important
to note that the stock market does not directly discipline officers and
directors. A stock price decline punishes investors; it does not, at least
directly, punish officers and directors. 127 A stock market decline in
response to corporate wrongdoing will only directly motivate directors
and officers to the extent that they are investors, have stock options,
or rely on strong stock performance for their job security.
Because stock price declines may cause more loss to
shareholders than to officers and directors, shareholders have a
125. See 148 CONG. REC. H1585 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. Toomey) ("I
think part of the problem with the substitute is an underlying failure to appreciate the ability of
the marketplace to impose some discipline as well. But we have already seen how severely and
appropriately investors have responded to companies who have even questionable accounting
practices after this Enron debacle.").
126. James K. Glassman, Capital Punishment, Tech Central Station (Mar. 14, 2002), at
http://www.techcentralstation.com/031402D.html.
127. See 148 CONG. REC. H1588 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 2002) (statement of Rep. LaFalce) ("[T]he
magic of the marketplace, you say the marketplace will punish. The marketplace punishes
investors. It does not punish the wrongdoers. You have got it wrong."). However, depending on
the strength of corporate governance controls, a significant drop in stock price could very well
cause executive officers to be replaced.
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natural incentive to push for the hiring of officers and directors who
will increase share value rather than those who will pillage the
company through securities fraud and other wrongdoing. 128 In theory
at least, shareholders control the corporation through electing
directors who, in turn, hire officers. 129 Shareholders can thereby make
sure that only officers and directors with clean records are hired.
Federal securities law ensures that shareholders are informed about
the recent criminal history of potential officers and directors.
Regulation S-K section 401(f) requires that annual proxy statements
disclose certain "events" of the past five years that are material to the
competency or integrity of any executive officer, director, or director
nominee. 130 Events that are material include criminal convictions,
entry of orders enjoining participation in the financial-services
industry, and adjudicated violations of federal securities laws. 131 With
this information, shareholders should be able to prevent the hiring of
securities law violators who would harm the company. Finally, even if
some bad actors are inadvertently hired, shareholders can always seek
redress through shareholder derivative lawsuits. 132
B. New Listing Requirements Should Help Prevent Abuse and Neglect
by Directors and Officers
Another factor that should reduce corporate wrongdoing,
regardless of suspension orders or other SEC action, is the new
corporate governing standards for listed companies that have been
adopted by the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the Nasdaq
Stock Market ("Nasdaq") (collectively, the "National Exchanges"133 ).
On August 16, 2002, the NYSE submitted for SEC approval new
128. Some argue that for this reason, and as a matter of public choice, removal of officers and
directors is more appropriate by shareholders than by the SEC. See Barnard, supra note 29.
129. Shareholders can not only elect directors, but can also remove them-with or without
cause in some states. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.08(a) (2002). Likewise, directors can remove
officers at any time with or without cause. § 8.43(b). Therefore, shareholders should have the
ability to discipline directors and to pressure directors into controlling the behavior of officers.
However, Part V.A will question the assumption that shareholders actually and effectively
control corporations.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(f) (2003).
131. Id.
132. See CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 395-97 (1999) (discussing the right of individual shareholders to bring a
derivative lawsuit on behalf of the corporation against management for breaches of fiduciary
duty).
133. Technically Nasdaq is not an "exchange" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
However, Nasdaq has applied to obtain qualification as an exchange. SEC Shortly To Turn Full




requirements for listed companies. Nasdaq did likewise on November
20, 2002.134 After a period for public comment, the proposed listing
standards by the National Exchanges were adopted by the SEC and
became effective on November 4, 2003.135 These new standards could
become a much more effective method of promoting corporate integrity
and accountability than the solutions implemented by Congress in
Sarbanes-Oxley.
The listing standards require that a majority of corporate
board members be independent and that certain committees be
entirely independent. 136 The definition of "independence" has been
tightened so that individuals who work for a company within the
previous five years (three years for Nasdaq) and certain members of
an interlocking directorate13 7 are presumed not independent. 138
Furthermore, nonmanager directors have to meet on a regular basis,
and shareholders have been given the right to vote on all executive
stock-option plans. 139 Violations of some of these and other new rules
could result in a public reprimand letter or even delisting of the
company. 140
These listing requirements should, to some extent, make
corporate boards of directors more independent of management. This
should improve the monitoring of officers by directors and reduce
instances of "captive boards" that capitulate to every officer request
and turn a blind eye to officer wrongdoing. Considering that almost
all large public firms are traded on either Nasdaq or the NYSE, these
changes should have a far-reaching effect. The increased board
independence, direct shareholder involvement, and greater disclosure
may provide some of the accountability and deterrence that was
sought by Sarbanes-Oxley's suspension provisions.
134. NASDAQ, SUMMARY OF NASDAQ CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS As OF FEBRUARY
26, 2003 (2003) (revising the earlier November 20, 2002 proposals), http://www.nasdaq.coni
about/WebCorp Gov-Summary%20Feb-revised.pdf; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE RULE PROPOSALS REFLECTING RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NYSE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE AS APPROVED BY THE NYSE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AUGUST 1, 2002 (2002), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-projb.pdf.
135. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm; NASDAQ, supra
note 134, at 1; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 134, at 1.
136. NASDAQ, supra note 134, at 2; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 134, at 5-10.
137. An interlocking directorate exists where an officer of company A sits on the board of
company B, and at the same time an officer of company B sits on the board of company A.
138. NASDAQ, supra note 134, at 2; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 134, at 6.
139. NASDAQ, supra note 134, at 1-2; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 134, at 6, 13.
140. NASDAQ, supra note 134, at 4-5; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 134, at 17-18;




C. Civil and Criminal Penalties Deter Corporate Fraud
One may justify the increase in the SEC's officer and director
bar powers by pointing out the deterrent effect that such power would
have on potential wrongdoers. If deterrence is the goal, however,
other changes wrought by Sarbanes-Oxley may be more appropriate
and effective. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act stiffens criminal penalties for
both violators of the securities laws and other white-collar
criminals. 141 The Act increases the criminal penalty for violations of
the Securities Exchange Act from "$1,000,000, or imprison[ment of]
not more than 10 years" to "$5,000,000, or imprison[ment of] not more
than 20 years."142 The Act also requires CEOs or CFOs to certify
financial statements and face fines or jail time if they know those
statements to be false. 143 Moreover, the Act calls on the United States
Sentencing Commission to enhance penalties for securities fraud and
related offenses in order to "ensure that the sentencing guidelines and
policy statements reflect the serious nature of securities, pension, and
accounting fraud and the need for aggressive and appropriate law
enforcement action to prevent such offenses."1 44
In addition to being a more effective deterrent than the threat
of a permanent bar, the stiffer criminal penalties provided by
Sarbanes-Oxley may also be the more appropriate remedy.
Injunctions by the SEC are designed to regulate conduct rather than
to punish.1 45 Although in many instances agencies are authorized to
issue civil penalties, those penalties are not to be "so punitive in either
purpose or effect" that they become de facto punishments. 146 Because
criminal penalties are designed partially to punish and deter, there is
a strong argument that Sarbanes-Oxley's criminal provisions are more
appropriate than its suspension provisions for going after corporate
wrongdoers.
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 405-06, 1104, 1106, 116 Stat. 745
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
142. § 1106.
143. § 906(a).
144. § 1104(a), (b)(1).
145. See Barnard, supra note 29, at 70.
146. U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). However, that is not to say that it is
uncommon for civil penalties to be used as de facto punishments.
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V. THERE IS STILL A NEED FOR OFFICER AND DIRECTOR SUSPENSIONS
Market forces, tougher standards by the National Exchanges,
and the threat of civil and criminal penalties should all prevent
corporate wrongdoing far more effectively than permanent suspension
of officers and directors by the SEC. Nevertheless, because of the
realities of corporate governance, shareholders, National Exchanges,
and criminal laws often exercise only limited control over executives.
In situations where those forces fail, permanent suspension of officers
and directors may be the best form of protection for the investing
public.
A. Where Market Forces and National Exchange Listing Standards Are
Not Effective
In most circumstances, shareholders will resist the hiring of an
officer or director with a history of securities fraud because they will
not trust such an individual to put the company's interests first and to
maximize shareholder value. However, there are some circumstances
in which an executive's criminal background may actually
demonstrate the opposite-i.e., that the executive is willing to do
everything it takes to maximize shareholder value, even if it involves
illegal conduct. 147 An executive who is fiercely dedicated to raising his
company's stock price even if it means breaking the law may be just
the type of person that shareholders would like to hire, especially
shareholders who do not intend to hold onto their stock for a long
period of time. 48 Since this sort of executive would be perceived as
being more loyal to the company than to the law, and hence more
likely to steal for the company than steal from it, he might be rehired
even after being convicted of a corporate crime. 49  Under such
circumstances, an officer or director bar may not be necessary to
protect a specific company's shareholders, but it would be vital to
147. Martin McDermott describes two broad categories of corporate crime: occupational
crime-which is committed by an individual in connection with his occupation and is done for
personal benefit-and organizational crime, which encompasses crimes committed by businesses
and employees to further the primary, legitimate purposes of the organization. Martin F.
McDermott, Occupational Disqualification of Corporate Executives: An Innovative Condition of
Probation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604, 605-06 (1982). It is the latter type, organizational
crime, which is less likely to be punished by the market and hence is more likely to require
permanent suspension.
148. See Morris, supra note 37, at 208.
149. See Stanton Wheeler et al., White Collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
331, 352 (1988); see also Barnard, supra note 35, at 1500.
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protect the market as a whole. 150 Even when they do not harm a
particular corporation's shareholders, violations of rules regarding
securities fraud may still cause harm to traders on the other side of
the transaction, damage the reputation of the stock market, harm
creditors, and have a negative impact on market liquidity.151
Even when shareholders do not want to hire executives with a
history of securities fraud, they may not always have the power to
prevent such hires.152 Although, in theory, shareholders elect
directors who appoint officers, in reality, the process is often reversed:
ultimate power resides in officers rather than shareholders. Strong
CEOs often decide who will be nominated as directors, and
shareholders have no real choice but to elect the single slate of
directors nominated. E.J. Epstein noted that, in 1984, "out of some six
thousand corporate elections of boards of directors, only eight offered
shareholders the possibility of voting for an alternate board of
directors, and in only three of these contests did the challenger
manage to win control through proxy solicitation."'' 53 Epstein went on
to argue that "shareholder suffrage is a myth perpetuated primarily
by marketers at the New York Stock Exchange."' 54  The corporate
governance requirements proposed by the National Exchanges may
shift the balance of power more towards shareholders in the future,
but that remains to be seen.
There are, therefore, at least two situations in which market
forces are likely to be insufficient for preventing corporate fraud. The
first is when shareholders have an incentive to hire executives who
may be able to boost their short-term share price but could harm the
securities market as a whole. The second is when shareholders lack
the power to prevent persons with prior convictions from being hired
150. See Morris, supra note 37, at 208 n.259 (citing Securities Law Enforcement: Hearing on
H.R. 975 Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong. 75 (1989) (statement of David S. Rider, former Chairman of
the SEC)).
151. Recent empirical research indicates that illegal insider trading has a negative impact on
liquidity. See Raymond P.H. Fishe & Michel A. Robe, The Impact of Illegal Insider Trading in
Dealer and Specialist Markets: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, J. FIN. MARKETS at 3
(2002), http://som.yale.eduljfm/ProgramPDFs/BWPapervllb.pdf.
152. It is not unheard of for persons with a history of corporate crime being rehired as
important executives. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 35, at 1500 nn.56-58 (citing several
instances of executives who became presidents of prominent companies after being convicted of
crimes including embezzlement).
153. E.J. EPSTEIN, WHO OWNS THE CORPORATION 15 (1986).
154. Barnard, supra note 29, at 64, n.216 (summarizing Epstein's argument from WHO OWNS
THE CORPORATION).
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as officers or directors of the corporation. 155 In situations where
perpetrators of corporate fraud might be rehired for either of the
above reasons, a permanent bar by the SEC may be the best way to
protect securities markets.
B. Where Criminal and Civil Penalties are Not Effective Deterrents
Like market forces, criminal and civil penalties may not always
provide the same degree of protection for securities markets as
permanent bars. Criminal and civil penalties deter corporate fraud by
means of fines and jail sentences. However, in the context of white-
collar crime, both fines and jail sentences may have only a modest
deterrent effect and may need to be supplemented by the threat of a
permanent suspension.
Monetary penalties may be imposed on dishonest executives in
any of three ways: criminal fines, civil fines, and civil judgments.
Awards against directors in fiduciary duty lawsuits may be massive, 156
and controlling persons who commit insider trading can be fined up to
the greater of $1 million or three times their profits, in addition to
orders of disgorgement or criminal fines. 157 However, indemnification
contracts, corporate by-laws, and insurance contracts can shift the
responsibility for payment of these fines from executives to
shareholders.1 5 8  Thus, many "large judgments [are ultimately]
payable in the last analysis [not by officers and directors but] by
innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers."1 59
Fiduciary duty of loyalty claims and other intentional or criminal
wrongdoings are generally not covered by indemnification or
insurance.' 60 However, the large salaries, bonuses, and severance
155. This would presumably be more likely where the convicted person has personal or
business ties to current officers and directors.
156. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Directors reportedly settled
this duty of care case for $23,500,000, though it appears that they personally paid little if any of
that amount. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 132, at 307.
157. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 132, at 1192 (discussing the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988).
158. State statutes allow corporations to indemnify officers and directors for breach of
fiduciary duty of care (but not breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty). See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, §
145(a), (b) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.59 official cmt. (2002).
159. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulpher Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J.,
concurring).
160. State statutes prohibit indemnification for illegal acts by executives. See NEW YORK




packages that are paid to many corporate executives can make the
monetary fines seem trivial.161
While indemnification may prevent fines from truly impacting
the alleged wrongdoer, permanent suspension cannot be so easily
avoided. An executive who is permanently barred from the corporate
suite will almost certainly not be able to earn as much money in the
future. Therefore, although permanent suspension is primarily about
preventing future fraud, it also imposes a serious monetary cost on the
wrongdoer. 162
The threat of jail may also be a less than ideal deterrent in the
context of white-collar crime. Corporate executives would certainly
want to avoid being sent to jail, but there is a common perception that
few white-collar criminals actually serve time. If they do, it is likely to
be fairly short; the median prison sentence for defendants convicted of
securities fraud is only twelve months. 163 A permanent suspension, on
the other hand, would not be so transitory. 64 Of course, most people
would be more intimidated by the threat of jail than the threat of
suspension, but if the possibility of jail seems remote, and an
ambitious executive is still in the early stages of her career,
permanent suspension may be more daunting.
Thus, although civil and criminal penalties are usually an
effective way to prevent corporate wrongdoing (especially after
Sarbanes-Oxley's stiffening of corporate criminal penalties), an
additional remedy may sometimes be needed. There are situations
where civil and criminal penalties fail and where officer and director
suspension can fill an important gap. When corporate offenders are
shielded from civil and criminal penalties through indemnification
and lenient law enforcement, officer and director bars may be the best
means to deter and prevent future corporate crimes.
Deterrence is typically associated with punishment, and
punishment is not properly the purpose of SEC injunctions. But if an
161. See McDermott, supra note 147, at 616 (discussing "informal indemnification" in the
form of added benefits and bonuses).
162. Id. at 615-16.
163. Barnard, supra note 35, at 1522 n.170 (citing DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE
MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 131 (1991)). It remains to
be seen whether or not Congress's recommendations to the Sentencing Commission in sections
905 and 1104 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will have a significant effect on the median sentence.
The recent seven year jail sentence imposed on former ImClone CEO Sam Waksall for insider
trading may indicate a trend toward more aggressive prosecution of securities violations in the
future. See Matthew Benjamin, The Wages of Sin: ImClone Founder Sam Waksal's Sentence
Signals Tough Times Ahead for Corporate Criminals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 23, 2003,
at 30.
164. Barnard, supra note 35, at 1522 n.170 (citing WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 163, at 131).
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SEC suspension is issued primarily to prevent repeat corporate
crimes, perhaps it is acceptable that suspension also has, as a by-
product, a deterrent or even punitive effect. 165 Defendants are still
able to seek work in a private firm or a nonexecutive-level job in a
public corporation. 166
C. High Rate of White-Collar Criminal Recidivism Indicates Need for
Suspension
Empirical studies that show a high rate of recidivism among
white-collar criminals also indicate the need for permanent
suspension in some cases. A 1988 study by Wheeler, Weisburd,
Waring, and Bode found that white-collar criminals had a surprisingly
high number of prior arrests. 167 Although the rates were not as high
as for common criminal defendants, the study found that forty-six
percent of white-collar offenders had a prior arrest, and thirty-four
percent had a prior conviction. 168 Securities fraud offenses, even more
than most other white-collar crimes, were especially likely to be
"patterned and repetitive."'' 69
Professor Barnard argues that a temporary or limited
suspension is always preferable to a comprehensive lifetime
suspension. 170  However, there does not appear to be any real
assurance that people who systematically break securities laws can be
trusted after a certain number of years. On the contrary, there is
anecdotal evidence of executives who committed fraud a number of
years after their first offense. For example, in 1971, Robert Maxwell,
president of Pergamon Press, was temporarily barred from company
management under a British suspension statute. 171 Twenty years
165. See McDermott, supra note 147, at 624 ("[C]ourts routinely impose remedies which, in
effect, penalize violations of civil statutes to deter third parties from similar conduct, even
though equity has traditionally forbidden forfeitures or imposition of decrees with penal
purposes.").
166. The SEC's suspension powers apply only to officers and directors (as opposed to lower
level employees) of publicly traded companies (as opposed to private firms). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(e),
78u(d) (2000).
167. Wheeler et al., supra note 149, at 342.
168. Id. The rate of prior convictions for those found guilty of securities fraud was 27.6%.
Id. at 345.
169. Id. at 343. In another study of people whom the SEC had investigated for securities
fraud violations, at least half had been investigated on one or more previous occasions-most
often for securities fraud. Barnard, supra note 35, at 1518 n.154 (citing SUSAN P. SHAPIRO,
WAYWARD CAPITALISTS 39 (1984)).
170. Barnard, supra note 29, at 34.
171. See Barnard, supra note 35, at 1502 n.65 and accompanying text (citing Peter J. Boyer,
Maxwell's Silver Hammer, VANITY FAIR, June 1991, at 112, 180).
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later, after successfully restarting his career, Maxwell was found to
have looted the pension funds at his new company. 72 Although it is
hard to imagine that Jeff Skilling, Enron's former CEO, would be
rehired in the near future, it does not seem unlikely that less
infamous perpetrators of securities fraud could return after a ten-year
hiatus and again commit crimes on the market. Therefore, a
temporary or limited bar may not always be sufficient.
Many white-collar criminals, and perhaps securities fraud
violators in particular, are likely to commit crimes again even after a
conviction. Because of the relatively high rate of recidivism and
because market forces and criminal penalties sometimes are not
enough, permanent bars rather than temporary suspension may
sometimes be the only way to prevent repeat offenses that rob others
and damage securities markets.
VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
While permanent officer and director bars may sometimes be
the only way to adequately discourage corporate wrongdoing, it is
important to also consider the potential costs of the increased SEC bar
powers. Two specific concerns that have been raised are the
possibility that the SEC will abuse its bar powers and the potential
that those powers (as well as other provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley) will
severely deplete the pool of people who are willing to serve as
directors.
A. Possibility that the SEC Will Abuse Its Bar Powers
The lower unfitness standard and grant of power to the SEC to
order permanent bars in cease-and-desist orders could result in abuse
of executive bars. When the SEC issues a permanent suspension
through a cease-and-desist proceeding, the agency is acting as
investigator, prosecutor, and judge.1 73 It is therefore understandable
172. Id. (citing Nicholas Bray, Securities Lending in UK Dealt Blow by Maxwell Affair, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 1991, at A10).
173. However, there is some separation within the SEC. SEC staff act as investigators,
whereas SEC commissioners (appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate) act as
judge and jury. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000) ("There is hereby established a Securities and
Exchange Commission... to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."); see also San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC,
378 F.2d 162, 167 (9th Cir. 1967) (stating that the SEC was not biased and had not prejudged
the case simply because it had relied upon a report by SEC staff).
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that some critics are concerned about defendants' due process
rights. 174
While concerns about potential abuses by the SEC are valid,175
a number of safeguards should mitigate the risk that the SEC will
abuse its new authority. First, and most importantly, even though the
SEC can issue officer and director bars directly through a cease-and-
desist proceeding, defendants always retain the ability to appeal
agency rulings to the federal courts. 176  Second, suspension is a
remedy that is only available to the SEC, and not to private parties. 77
If the bar orders that the SEC has sought in the past are any guide to
the agency's future actions, it seems likely that only those executives
who commit egregious violations will be permanently barred. 78
Third, suspension cannot be imposed on people who only innocently or
negligently violate a provision of the securities laws. A defendant has
to be in breach of one of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
to be suspended, 79 and the antifraud provisions are usually not
triggered unless the defendant demonstrates scienter (as opposed to
mere negligence). 8 0 Thus, there are enough safeguards in place so
that due process concerns should not outweigh the benefits provided
by the SEC's bar powers.' 8 '
174. Barnard, supra note 29, at 72. Barnard is also concerned, perhaps even more so, that
permanent suspension interferes with the due process rights of shareholders to choose directors
and officers of their choosing. Id. at 35. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit has ruled that SEC administrative compliance proceedings do not violate the due
process clause of the constitution. Binder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1104-08 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
175. Broader concerns about the breadth of prosecutorial and adjudicative discretion granted
to many agencies are also valid. See Michael R. Lanzarone, Professional Discipline: Unfairness
and Inefficiency in the Administrative Process, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 818, 819-22 (1983).
176. However, many bar orders are not appealed because they are reached as part of a
settlement rather than a cease-and-desist order or injunction. See supra Part II.A.
177. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1105, 116 Stat. 745, 809-10 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201-7266).
178. See infra Part II.
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(t)(e), 78u(d) (2000).
180. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193, 214 (1976) (holding that scienter is
necessary for a violation of Section 10(b), so that mere negligent behavior will not fall within the
antifraud provision).
181. Furthermore, this is not the only law whereby a person's future employment options are
limited. Disbarment and revocation of professional licenses are other examples. Another is
federal banking law, which does not allow any person convicted of a criminal offense involving
dishonesty or a breach of trust to "participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs
of any insured depository institution." 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(1)(A) (2000).
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B. Uncertain Definition of "Unfitness" Is a Disincentive for Potential
Directors
The scandals of the past several years have underscored the
importance of having a strong board of directors to provide oversight
and accountability for officers. However, one of the unintended
consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley may be to discourage some capable
people from serving as directors. Representative Michael Oxley (R.
Ohio), cosponsor of the Act, told a meeting of the National Association
of Corporate Directors that Sarbanes-Oxley may make it difficult to
recruit the requisite independent board members. 8 2  This is a
particularly apt consideration considering both the ease with which
the SEC can now issue a permanent bar and the fact that there is no
definition of what constitutes unfitness. Would-be directors who do
not feel confident that they can recognize unfit behavior before it is too
late may decline to serve rather than risk a permanent bar.
Recent statistics support Representative Oxley's contention
that directors are becoming more difficult to find. A vice chairman of
executive recruiting firm Spencer Stuart said that only one out of
eight director candidates that he pursues today accepts a seat,
compared to one out of four just five years ago. 8 3 The increase in
average board member salary in recent years provides further
evidence that it is getting harder to find board members.'8 4
The increase in board salaries, however, is probably much more
closely related to directors' fear of civil liability and increased
workload than to concern over an SEC suspension order.18 5 It is
doubtful that eliminating the SEC's suspension powers would
significantly change any potential or actual director shortage.
Furthermore, the drafters of Sarbanes-Oxley attempted to alleviate
directors' liability concerns somewhat by removing the chairman of
182. Phyllis Plitch, US Rep Oxley: Accounting Bill 'Struck Reasonable Balance,' Dow JONES
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 30, 2002, WL 9/30/02 DJNS 16:45:00. The reasons that people will be
reluctant or unable to serve as directors are primarily the increased fear of liability, but there
can also be other reasons, such as those requiring directors to have accounting expertise. Id.
183. Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Governance (A Special Report)-More Work More Pay:
Directors Are Taking on Greater Responsibility These Days; And Despite Shareholder
Skittishness, They're Getting Bigger Paychecks as Well, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R4.
184. A December 2002 poll of sixty companies found that two thirds of those surveyed
increased directors' compensation last year or plan to do so. Id. On average, directors received
about $152,000 in 2001. Id.
185. The time demanded of directors at large corporations has increased by twenty five
percent over the past ten years. Moreover, directors who fail to detect fraud by managers are
now more likely to face lawsuits and public criticism. Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Governance (A
Special Report)--How to Fix a Broken System: A Rush of New Plans Promise to Make Corporate
Boards More Accountable. Will They Work?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R1.
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the board from the list of individuals who must certify a company's
financial statements.186 Potential board members can take comfort in
the fact that, in order to be barred, they must not only be deemed
"unfit" but must also be found guilty of securities fraud-a violation
which is well defined in case law and requires a fairly high level of
scienter. 187 The risk of repelling qualified directors is therefore not
serious enough to justify limiting the SEC's suspension powers. 188
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the SEC's increased suspension powers will fill an
important gap in securities fraud prevention, there are additional
actions that the SEC could take to make the suspension provisions
more effective. First, the SEC should consider issuing a release
explaining its position on officer and director bars. Such a release
would remind corporate America that this provision exists, and put
potential defrauders on notice of yet one more reason to obey
securities laws. 189 This release could also provide an opportunity for
the SEC to clarify what it thinks constitutes unfitness deserving of a
permanent suspension. By defining unfitness, the SEC could provide
additional security for honest people who serve on boards of directors
but are worried about inadvertently stepping over an invisible line
and having their careers cut short. This might even be an excellent
opportunity for the SEC (instead of the federal courts) to set the terms
of what constitutes unfitness after Sarbanes-Oxley. 190
Several recent examples illustrate the benefits that could be
gained by an SEC release defining unfitness. Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-
2, passed in 2000, define trading on the basis of insider information
186. See President Signs Sweeping Corporate Reform Bill into Law, DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP.,
Aug. 19, 2002, at 10, 11. CEOs and CFOs, on the other hand, can face as much as $5 million in
fines and twenty years in prison for willful false financial statements. Michael Rosenzweig,
Corporate Responsibility Redefined: How to Prepare for the Coming Changes, THE CORP.
COUNSELLOR, Aug. 2002, at 1.
187. See supra note 180.
188. Phyllis Plitch, Corporate Governance (A Special Report)--Ready and Able? Companies
Say the List of Qualified Directors is Depressingly Short. Critics Say That's Because Companies
Are Looking in the Wrong Places, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 2003, at R3 (discussing the argument that
there are plenty of qualified board members available, and that the perceived shortage is only
the result of current directors' failure to look beyond their limited social and professional circles).
189. There have been relatively few permanent suspensions to date (although the number is
increasing), and the SEC's increased power in this area has so far gotten little attention in the
press. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
190. Sarbanes-Oxley's change from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness" is not precise, but it
clearly indicates that Congress is lowering the bar on when permanent suspensions can be
issued. It would seem that whoever addresses the issue first be it the courts or the SEC-has
the opportunity to set the stage for defining where the bar is now.
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and duties of trust or confidence for purposes of insider trading
cases. 191 Regulation FD,' 92 also passed in 2000, prohibits selective
disclosure of information by issuers of securities and clearly defines
the scope of liability under the regulation. 193 These rules provide the
certainty needed to avoid costly litigation, and in the case of Rules
10b5-1 and 10b5-2, have allowed for more wealth-creating
transactions.' 94 Similarly, some guidance by the SEC with regard to
"unfitness" could encourage capable people to serve as directors and
maximize wealth in the securities markets. 95
This Note will not attempt to recommend every factor that the
SEC should include in its definition of unfitness. It would seem
reasonable to include some of the factors from the Patel II test, such as
egregiousness, scienter, and evidence of ongoing fraud, but if the
Commission does so, it should clearly state that no single factor is
dispositive for a permanent suspension. 196 In the past, the S(EC has
rightly noted that defining securities fraud too precisely could have a
deleterious effect.1 97 The SEC has called bright-line fraud definitions
"blueprint[s] for fraud."198  Instead, the Commission prefers to keep
some ambiguity to prevent unscrupulous executives and their lawyers
from creating schemes that stay within the letter of securities fraud
regulations but nonetheless violate the intent and spirit of the law.1 99
The SEC will therefore have the difficult task of providing enough
certainty to encourage honest, qualified individuals to serve as
191. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1, 240.10b5-2 (2003).
192. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100 - 243.103 (2003).
193. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,718-20 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(final rule).
194. By defining trading "on the basis of' insider information and "duties of trust or
confidence," the Rules allow parties to engage in securities transactions that they might
otherwise avoid due to worry that they would violate a securities law. If both parties engaged in
the trade voluntarily with full disclosure of information, then the trade transfers the security to
the party that values it more highly, thereby creating wealth.
195. This guidance should not, however, be too specific, as discussed in the following
paragraph.
196. See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). The SEC might also suggest that it
only be required to show a "reasonable likelihood" that future violations are likely before a
suspension can be issued; or perhaps even place the burden on the defendant to show that future
violations are unlikely to occur.
197. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 14 (2001); see also Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 650-51, 662-64 (2002)
(noting that the SEC supported using "recklessness," as opposed to a knowing state of mind, as
the national fraud standard).




directors, while simultaneously providing enough flexibility to
prosecute clever defrauders.
In addition to issuing a release on officer and director bars, the
SEC must demonstrate its willingness to use its expanded bar powers.
This should be done so as to demonstrate both the SEC's willingness
to use its increased powers and its care to only bar egregious
wrongdoers who present a real threat to securities markets. 200 The
SEC's action against Martha Stewart in June of 2003 provides a good
example of the sort of balance that will be needed.
Martha Stewart's high profile makes it certain that many
people will take notice and become aware of the possibility of
temporary and permanent suspensions by the SEC. At the same time,
the SEC has attempted to demonstrate restraint by barring Martha
Stewart from serving as a director but allowing her to continue to
serve as an officer (albeit in a somewhat limited fashion) in her own
company. 20 1 The restrictions sought by the SEC would allow Martha
Stewart to continue contributing to the creative end of Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia to avoid causing undue damage to the
company. 202
The firm-but-measured approach that the SEC has taken with
Martha Stewart will be important to retain in the future. If the
enforcement is too lenient or used too infrequently, the SEC's
suspension powers will continue to be ineffective as a deterrent. On
the other hand, if the enforcement is too aggressive there could be a
backlash against the SEC by the public and federal courts. If the
SEC's use of bars against alleged securities law violators like Martha
Stewart is perceived as being excessive, the Commission could lose the
political momentum currently supporting its crackdown on corporate
wrongdoers. 20 3 Moreover, if the SEC is overly aggressive in issuing
200. Direct suspensions by the SEC will now come through cease-and-desist orders rather
than through injunctions. However, according to legislative history and the past practices of the
SEC, cease-and-desist orders are generally to be used for less serious violations while injunctions
are said to be more appropriate for serious violations. See Morrissey, supra note 45, at 465-66.
Courts may be leery of this expanded role of the cease-and-desist order, but courts are not likely
to overturn cease-and-desist order suspensions since they are so clearly permitted now by
statute.
201. Wolverton, supra note 1.
202. Id.; see also SEC: Curbs on Stewart Not Meant to Damage Company-NYT, WSJ.com
(June 4, 2003) (Director of the SEC's northeastern regional office told the New York Times that
"the kinds of limitations we are looking at would allow her to continue in the creative end of the
company, but remove her from other activities. We do not want to do anything that damages the
company if it can be avoided.") (on file with author).
203. Indeed, some see the SEC's enforcement actions against Martha Stewart as being
excessive, especially given the fact that the insider trading case against her does not seem
entirely certain nor particularly egregious. See Erin McClam, Martha's Message: 6 Million Visit
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permanent suspensions, there is a risk that federal courts might begin
to strike down those bars on appeal and adopt a new standard that is
only slightly less stringent than the Patel II test-thus only paying lip
service to the change from "substantial unfitness" to "unfitness."
VIII. CONCLUSION
Recent corporate scandals have powerfully demonstrated how
much destruction of wealth and damage to public confidence can
result from corporate fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 provides
a number of changes to help reduce fraud in the future. One of those
changes is increased power for the SEC to permanently bar securities
fraud violators from serving as officers or directors of publicly traded
companies. Although the SEC has had this power since the Remedies
Act was enacted in 1990, it has had trouble issuing suspensions
because of the stringent standard for substantial unfitness adopted by
the courts. Congress increased the SEC's power to issue permanent
suspensions by lowering the standard from substantial unfitness to
unfitness and by allowing the SEC to issue suspension orders directly
in a cease-and-desist proceeding without going through the federal
courts.
Permanent officer and director suspensions are frequently
unnecessary due to a number of other factors that reduce corporate
fraud. However, while market forces and criminal and civil penalties
may serve to deter corporate fraud in most cases, there are times
when all of these factors fail. In those situations, a permanent bar
may be the best way to protect the investing public and the integrity
of the United States markets.
Several concerns need to be considered in the context of
permanent bars, including the due process rights of defendants and
shareholders and the possible negative effects on the pool of capable
and willing directors. However, there are a number of safeguards that
protect the defendant facing permanent suspension, and the impact of
suspension law on potential directors is probably quite low. Still, it
may be beneficial for the SEC to issue a release that explains some of
its criteria for issuing suspensions, provided that the release contains
Her Defense Web Site, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, June 9, 2002, WL 6/9/03 APWIRES
19:42:00 ("Fans have suggested Stewart is being charged because she is a celebrity and that her
case pales in comparison to other corporate fraud."); see also James Toedtman, Securities Law
Tested; One Year Later, Measure Shows Mixed Results, NEWSDAY (New York), July 27, 2003, at
A43 ("[S]o far, showcase executives Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling of Enron, Bernard Ebbers of
WorldCom, Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco, Scrushy and others whose high salaries and lavish
lifestyles were examples of what Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan called 'an
era of infectious greed' remain unpunished.").
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a good balance of security for well-meaning executives and flexibility
for future enforcement purposes. It will also be important to
prosecute securities fraud violators such as Martha Stewart in a way
that demonstrates the Commission's willingness to use its suspension
powers and its moderation in only pursuing defendants with a high
degree of scienter and culpability. It may prove difficult for the SEC
to strike this balance, but if it succeeds in doing so, the officer and
director bar provisions may become a much more important force in
the future for protecting the integrity of U.S. markets.
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